5. Bank Bailout Policy: The Problems of Time Inconsistency and Moral Hazards by Kozo Kunimune
5. Bank Bailout Policy: The Problems of Time
Inconsistency and Moral Hazards 
権利 Copyrights 日本貿易振興機構（ジェトロ）アジア
経済研究所 / Institute of Developing
Economies, Japan External Trade Organization
(IDE-JETRO) http://www.ide.go.jp
シリーズタイトル(英
)
Occasional Papers Series
シリーズ番号 39
journal or
publication title
Overcoming Asia's Currency and Financial
Crises: A Theoretical Investigation
page range 76-93
year 2004
URL http://hdl.handle.net/2344/00010631
5Bank Bailout Policy: The Problems of
Time Inconsistency and
Moral Hazards
I. Introduction
Banks are much more likely to be rebuilt than liquidated. Moreover, public
funds (taxes) are frequently used when rebuilding is needed. First, let us
consider the reason for this. Like any business enterprise, whenever a bank’s
debt structure worsens to an extreme degree, it becomes necessary to begin
bankruptcy proceedings; and how to proceed should depend on a comparison
between the value of continuing operations and that of liquidation. However,
in the case of banks, there is a greater tendency for the former to exceed the
latter than in the case of non-financial enterprises. The reason is that banks
have external economies. Furthermore, liquidation value tends to decrease
only to the extent that their managers and employees lose the will to continue
operations. This is also true of nonfinancial enterprises; however, the value of
factories and machinery will probably not decline.1 However, what happens in
the case of banks is that their employees lose the will to continue, resulting in
neglect of lending management duties and a decline in the value of loan
assets, which are the most important bank holdings. For example, as soon as
doubt arises about a borrower’s ability to repay his loans, efforts should be
made to protect bank claims as early as possible; but if bank employees
neglect their duties and fail to notice that a borrower has gone into the red, the
resulting lack of effort to protect bank claims can cause large losses in the
value of loan assets.
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Turning to the reason for using public funds to rebuild banks, external
economies are included in the value of continuing operations. It is a very rare
case that economic actors in the private sector will be spontaneously willing
to pay for such external economies. Therefore, it becomes necessary for
public entities, like the government, to step in and inject public funds.
Table 5-1 summarizes how financial institutions were handled in four coun-
tries that experienced serious financial difficulties following the Asian cur-
rency crisis. The table shows that these countries preferred continuing opera-
tions through nationalization and merger to bank closures. This tendency can
be seen much more clearly if one looks at the share that the assets (figures in
parentheses) of such troubled institutions account for within the whole financial
sector. For example, in the case of Indonesia, there were sixty-four banks that
were closed; however, the share of their assets within the whole system came
to only 18 per cent, which is far less than the total shares of those temporarily
nationalized (20 per cent) and those merged (54 per cent).
The high possibility that banks will be reorganized with public funds be-
comes the cause of moral hazards arising in bank management. This is not a
problem for banks that are closed or bailed out, but the way in which such
banks are handled is related to the motivation behind managing other banks in
the future. When bank managers see how the government is bailing out other
banks, they begin to consider how their own banks will be dealt with in the
future. Therefore, it is necessary to consider such undesirable side effects
when deciding how to deal with failing banks. However, it is almost impos-
sible to avoid the occurrence of moral hazards (hereafter MH) completely
because it is difficult for governments to commit themselves to no bank
bailouts under any circumstances. Here we have a time inconsistency2 prob-
lem.
In section II below, we would like to shed light on the necessary conditions
for avoiding time inconsistency and preventing the occurrence of MH prob-
lems. Then in Section III, we will examine the process of policy-making in
cases where bank bailouts are being implemented, using the experience of
countries in the aftermath of the Asian currency crisis.
II. Time Inconsistency and Bank Bailout Policy: Model Analysis
A. Simple Model
To begin with, we will explain how time inconsistency arises, using a
simple model. The model assumes:
(1) Ex ante decision-making by the government.
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A: The government announces that it will not bailout failing banks
under any circumstances whatsoever.
B: The government announces that it will bailout failing banks in
time of crisis.
(2) Behavior by private banks.
N: MH will not occur.
M: MH will occur.
(In addition, when the government implements bank bailouts, MH
behavior is advantageous; when the government refuses to bail out
banks, such behavior become disadvantageous.)
(3) Ex post actual government action
a: No bank bailouts implemented.
b: Bank bailouts implemented.
(4) Any bank involved in MH will fail, and any failing bank not involved
in MH will not fail. (This stipulation will be loosened later.)
(5) The social cost of bank failure (C) is less when the bank is bailed out.
(See Table 5-2.)
From Table 5-2, we find that the lowest costs involved in bank failure will
be incurred by the combinations of actions (N, a) and (N, b).3
From the government’s point of view, the following combination of poli-
cies and private sector reaction becomes ideal. First, the government an-
nounces its no-bailout policy in advance with the intention of preventing MH.
Then banks do not become involved in MH, believing that the government
will carry through with its decision. When this is the case for this simple
model, no bank failure will occur, so ex post government policy becomes
superfluous. Whether the government adopts a bailout policy or no-bailout
policy makes no difference, since there will be no bank failures. However, it is
highly possible that the banks simply do not believe in the government’s
commitment to a no-bailout policy. The reason for this is that the government
has every incentive to bailout banks once they fail, regardless of its ex ante
announcement. When dealing with actual incidents of MH, the government
TALBLE  5-2
COMPARISON OF BANK FAILURE COST UNDER
ASSUMPTIONS (2) AND (3)
a b
N 0 0
M C1 C2
Note: We assume C1 > C2 (Assumption 5).
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makes its “ex post” choices looking at the second row of Table 5-2 (see Table
5-3).
Since C1 > C2, despite ex ante announcements, there is incentive on the
part of the government to bailout banks ex post (action b). Banks that discover
this fact will act rationally and cause MH (action M), regardless of previous
government announcements.
B. Examination of the Simple Model
Let us first examine the policy of not bailing out banks in order to prevent
MH. As seen above, in order to solve problems caused by time inconsistency,
expectations held by banks concerning how the government will act in the
future are very important; and these will depend on whether or not banks
expect that the government will not bail out banks in the future. Whenever
time inconsistency exists, banks will not believe that the government will
carry through with its announced future policy. Therefore, one way or another
it is necessary to narrow the kinds of behavior in the future. As a rather far-
fetched example, adding an amendment to the national constitution prohibit-
ing bank bailouts would increase trust in the government’s policy statements;
but even such a step would not result in complete trust since the constitution
could be amended once again in the opposite direction. Thus, when conditions
are right for the rise of time inconsistency, solving the problem completely
becomes a very difficult task indeed.
Therefore, the question arises as to whether it is actually possible to solve
the problem of time consistency by implementing a non-bank-bailout policy
during a banking crisis. The intent behind the claim that no bank bailouts will
be carried out is to prevent future MH. Any attempt to show that the govern-
ment intends to carry through with its decision will probably shore up trust;
but it will not be complete. For example, people may trust the present
government’s intentions, but that does not mean that they will trust the inten-
tion of any future government.
In sum, since the past action of governments does not directly narrow the
measures available to governments in the future, the possibility of persuading
TABLE  5-3
BANK FAILURE COST COMPARISON ASSUMING
MH INCIDENCE
a b
M C1 C2
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banks is not completely assured. But other than the difficulties presented here,
we should examine whether or not the problem of time inconsistency actually
exists in the first place. Particularly in the context of developing countries,
conditions giving rise to time inconsistency may in fact be absent; and if so,
what are the policy implications?
C. A General Model
Here let us examine a model in which the above assumptions for our simple
model are modified to be more in line with general conditions. Assumptions
(1), (2), (3), and (5) will remain unchanged, while (4) will be revised as
follows.
(4′) The probability of failure (Pm) for those banks that cause MH will
increase, but will never reach 100 per cent. Also, the probability of
failure (Pn) for those banks that do not cause MH will never be zero.
However, it is more likely that MH banks will fail. We assume Pn < Pm.
Assumption (5) remains the same; but even when a bank chooses behavior
N, there is still a chance that it will fail, necessitating a revision of Table 5-2;
and since it becomes a random event, we need to distinguish between ex ante
and ex post cost. First, let us consider the cost of dealing with bank failure ex
post. (See Table 5-4.)
Turning to ex ante costs, since expected cost is the problem here, we
multiply ex post cost by the probability of bank failure (Table 5-5).
Here, we will add two more assumptions concerning ex post cost.
(6) Cna > Cnb, Cma > Cmb. This assumption is the most plausible, given that
bank bailouts reduce the cost of bank failures.
TABLE  5-4
COST OF BANK FAILURE: EX POST
a b
N Cna Cnb
M Cma Cmb
Note: Cna is the cost incurred by a non-MH
bank failure under a policy of no bank bail-
outs; Cnb is the cost incurred by non-MH bank
failure when bank bailout measures exist; Cma
is the cost incurred by MH bank failure under
a policy of no bank bailouts; and Cmb is the cost
incurred by MH bank failure when bank bail-
out measures exist.
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(7) Cna < Cma, Cnb < Cmb. This assumption is the most plausible, given that
banks who cause MH increase the cost of failure.
From assumptions (6) and (7), it turns out that Cma is the largest value,
whereas Cnb is the smallest. However, we cannot determine the relative size of
Cna or Cmb. Similarly, from assumptions (4′), (6), and (7), PmCma is the largest
value, whereas PnCnb is the smallest. We cannot determine the relative size of
PnCna or PmCmb.
Now, when Pn = 0, Pm = 1, Cma = C1 and Cmb = C2, Tables 5-4 and 5-5
become identical to Table 5-2 for our simple model. In other words, the simple
model is a special case of the general model.
Discussion 1: Optimum outcome
First, let us consider if an optimum outcome can be achieved before the
fact; that is, where the expected costs in Table 5-5 are minimized. Tables 5-6
and 5-7 show two possibilities concerning the order of expected costs.
TABLE  5-5
EXPECTED COST OF BANK FAILURE: EX ANTE
a b
N PnCna PnCnb
M PmCma PmCmb
TABLE  5-6
ORDER OF EX ANTE EXPECTED COST OF BANK FAILURE:
CASE 1
a b
N 2 1
M 4 3
Note: The less the integer, the lower the cost.
TABLE  5-7
ORDER OF EX ANTE EXPECTED COST OF BANK FAILURE:
CASE 2
a b
N 3 1
M 4 2
Note: The less the integer, the lower the cost.
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In either case, the combination of actions N and b is the most desirable
outcome (results in the lowest cost), while combination (M, a) represents the
worst scenario.
The problem is whether combination (N, b) can actually be realized. From
assumption (2) the choice of action N by banks can only be realized if they
believe that the government will indeed carry through with its no bailout
policy. On the other hand, in order to attain the optimum outcome, the govern-
ment must choose to bailout banks after the fact (action b). Therefore, the
optimum outcome can only be realized if (1) the government succeeds in
persuading the banking industry that it will not bail them out, and (2) it
reneges after the fact and decides to bail banks out. In other words, it depends
on the government being able to deceive the banking industry, which is very
difficult, and probably impossible, in reality. This is because if the banking
industry assumes that the government is acting rationally, it is very difficult
for the latter to outwit the former. Therefore, we conclude that in general, it is
impossible to achieve the optimum outcome.
Discussion 2: The next best outcome A (corresponding to Case 1)
There are two different cases for the next best outcome. In Case 1 (Table 5-
6), the next best combination of behavior is (N, a). Here, the government (1)
succeeds in persuading the banking industry that it means what it says in
deciding against bailouts, and (2) in fact carries through with that decision. In
this case, it is possible to adopt the discussion for the time inconsistency
framework in the simple model. In other words, (N, a) can only be realized if
the banking industry is thoroughly convinced that the government will not
bail it out under any condition. If not, (M, b) will be realized.
Discussion 3: The next best outcome B (corresponding to Case 2)
The general model becomes more interesting when operating under Case 2
(Table 5-7). Here the next best combination is (M, b), in which (1) the govern-
ment decides to bail out banks, and (2) banks are causing MH. Such condi-
tions are extremely easy to achieve, since the government does not have to
announce its policy in advance and the actions it takes after the fact are
consistent with its motivation, meaning that time inconsistency will not arise.
Therefore, in this case, there is no use in trying to employ a non-bailout policy
in the first place. Before going into the policy implications here, let us con-
sider the conditions under which Case 2 happens.
Discussion 4: The boundary between Case 1 and Case 2
What are the conditions that separate Cases 1 and 2? Let us consider how
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Case 2 comes about. The following two equations express the differences
between the two cases.
Case 1: PnCna < PmCmb,
Case 2: PnCna > PmCmb.
Therefore, the higher Pn or Cna, the easier it is for Case 2 to happen.
Transforming the conditions that make Case 2 possible, we come up with
Cna / Cmb > Pm / Pn;
the smaller the right side and the larger the left side, the more probable Case 2
will become.
Macro shock
What causes Pm / Pn to become smaller is the existence of macro shock.
Macro shock is uncertainty that influences the whole economy, but here let us
express it as a factor increasing the possibility of bank failures, regardless of
whether or not individual banks are causing MH.
The probability of bank failure can be expressed as
Pm = αm + β,
Pn = αn + β,
where αm and αn are changes occurring in bank behavior, and αm > αn; and β is
a common factor expressing macro shock: for example, the possibility of bank
failures due to circumstances affecting the whole economy, like instability
stemming from macro-economic policy errors. In that case:
Pm
=
αm + β
Pn αn + β
=
αm − αn + 1.
αn + β
Therefore, the larger the value of β, the smaller the value of Pm / Pn, and the
easier it is for Case 2 to occur.
For example, in developing countries, where macroeconomic instability is
high and there is a strong possibility of a banking crisis occurring, Case 2 is
likely to happen regardless of how well banks are being managed.
Different safety nets
Differences in safety nets to combat banking crises affect the magnitude of
Cna / Cmb. The desirable safety net for a financial system that assumes the
government will not bail out banks differs from the one that assumes it will.
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Furthermore, the type of safety net that has been prepared in an economy will
affect the magnitude of the social cost of bank failures.
Safety nets set up under the assumption that bank bailouts will not be
implemented (Type A) necessitate measures other than bailouts that prevent a
crisis from deepening. For example, if inter-bank settlements are carried out
through an RTGS mechanism, the possibility of a chain reaction of bank
failures can be lessened. Also, the prompt disclosure of bank-related account-
ing information is an important measure for preventing a chain reaction of
bank runs by worried depositors. It would also be effective if the government
could spot any worsening bank operations at an early stage and take early
corrective measures. In other words, prompt corrective action is effective.4
Safety nets that presume bank bailouts (Type B) necessitate measures that
ensure continuous, effective implementation of bailout policy. For example, if
a country has explicit legislation that describes procedures for government-
led bank bailouts and financial restructuring, cleaning up after a financial
crisis would be smoother and involve less pain.
Type-A safety nets are relatively well prepared in developed countries
compared to ones in developing countries. Therefore, it can be assumed that
developing countries tend toward having rather large Cna / Cmb numbers, which
makes the occurrence of Case 2 more likely. Furthermore, in recent years
research has been published, mainly by the World Bank, concerning the pros
and cons of setting up a deposit insurance system, arguing that in the case of
institutionally weak governments, the adoption of such a system could in-
crease the possibility of a financial crisis occurring (World Bank 2001, Chap.
2; Demirguc-Kunt and Kane 2002). Since deposit insurance systems are con-
sidered to be type-B safety nets, their introduction makes it easier for Case 2
to occur which increases the chances of a financial crisis breaking out. This
argument is consistent with the model presented here.
The institutional strength of a particular government is also important.
When considered in the light of the present model, it can be assumed that
institutionally capable governments set up type-A safety nets simultaneously
with their type-Bs. For that reason, the effects of both cancel each other out,
and the introduction of a deposit insurance system will not increase the chance
of a financial crisis occurring. Institutionally weak governments, on the other
hand, may have difficulty in introducing type-A safety nets.
In recent years the trend has been to decrease the number of banks and
increase their size through mergers and acquisitions. However, this can be
dangerous because the failure of a gargantuan bank will have a much worse
impact on the economy as a whole, meaning a rising Cna in the above model,
making Case 2 more likely to occur.
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Moreover, the heightened of competition among banks and between banks
and other financial institutions because of deregulation may improve the
efficiency of banking operations, but it may also increase the probability of
bank failures.5 If we assume that the probability of bank failure has the same
effect on MH and non-MH banks alike, deregulation becomes a factor raising
β.
D. Policy Implications
The most important conclusion to draw from the above model is that if Case
2 occurs, there will be no problem of time inconsistency, which means that
adopting a bank bailout policy will be the next best measure to take (when the
optimum cannot be implemented.) Moral hazards will occur, but they should
be tolerated.
There is the possibility of Case 2 scenarios occurring in at least some of the
world’s developing countries, especially when there is a lot of macroeco-
nomic instability, and type-A safety nets are not well prepared. Therefore,
non-bailout policies cannot be recommended unconditionally. Rather, the
preparation of type-A safety nets and improvement in macroeconomic policy
to prevent or decrease the occurrence of macro shock should take priority over
non-bailout policies. Only after conditions for Case 1 develop does it become
important for governments to persuade banks that bailouts will not be imple-
mented, and to set up mechanisms through which governments can commit
themselves to non-bailout policies.
The intention here is not to give the impression of favoring bank bailouts or
wishing to legitimize them; rather, it is to clarify the preconditions for mean-
ingful non-bailout policies, i.e., setting up Type-A safety nets, improving
macroeconomic policy frameworks to minimize macro shock and setting up
institutional mechanisms to ensure that bank bailouts will not be carried out.
Considering the need for such preconditions, it is hard to criticize any country
unconditionally for adopting bank bailouts as a means to control a financial
crisis. It is probably better to make decisions on a case-by-case basis, because
it is only after the above conditions have been satisfied that a non-bailout
policy becomes advisable and effective.
 Although the above mentioned research done on the effects of deposit
insurance systems is consistent with the model offered in this chapter, we
differ widely about policy implications. In contrast to the World Bank’s argu-
ment that institutionally weak governments should not introduce deposit in-
surance systems, the present model does not suggest such an unconditional
approach. This is because in a Case 2 scenario, the second best response to a
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banking crisis is adopting a bailout policy. An unconditional statement that
“banks should not be bailed out under any conditions” prevents people from
thinking about bailouts which can be a less harmful approach. Discussion of
this point has been far too scarce in the relevant research. Therefore it is very
important to examine how to go about the task when a bank bailout policy is
an acceptable option. The following section will address that issue.
III. How to Conduct a Bank Bailout Program
A. Infusing Capital Funds
Even after the decision has been made to begin bailing out banks, attention
must be paid to moral hazard problems. Although there is no way of com-
pletely avoiding MH, policy considerations should be made to mitigate their
effect. For example, methods that invest government funds in failing banks
cost-free are not desirable since granting subsidies to failing banks is the same
thing as imposing penalties on healthy banks. Instead, the government should
infuse capital funds on an investment basis giving it stockholder rights and
guaranteed dividends. Moreover, government investment should be made fol-
lowing capital reductions, thus penalizing existing stockholders for their fail-
ure to discipline bank management. An even more stringent method is to
dissolve the bank, then reorganize it as a new corporation using government
funds.
When the government invests a large amount of funds, it becomes the
equivalent of nationalization; and when the investment exceeds 50 per cent of
the total, the problem arises as to how the government should act as the
majority stockholder. The usual thinking is that even when infusing such a
large amount of capital, the government should never become involved in
bank management. However, there are problems with this thinking.
A major one is the problem of agency cost. If the government neglects its
duty as a stockholder to supervise and monitor bank operations, leaving the
task up to others, there is a real possibility that following the infusion of funds,
the bank’s corporate governance will be weakened. Since the share of other
stockholders will be diluted in proportion to the increase in the government’s
share, the former’s incentive to supervise and monitor the performance of
bank management will be weakened. If the government does not compensate
for such tendencies, stockholder supervision and monitoring will be weak-
ened on the whole. When the government contributes 100 per cent of the
funds (complete nationalization), there are no other stockholders to keep the
bank in line, so the government has no other choice than to take over that
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responsibility. However, the government should not intervene in bank opera-
tions other than to make sure that they are being conducted properly. For
example, actions like the government putting pressure on bank managers to
allot funds on a priority basis to specific borrowers would merely damage the
bank’s efficiency.
The government can also have conflicts of interest when infusing funds
because of its multi-facetted duties. For example, the government is also
interested in stabilizing the economy and maintaining national employment,
and is capable of forcing conditions on banks that could be detrimental to their
healthy management. One case in point is the government demanding that a
bank continue to grant credit to a large, but failing, enterprise out of fear of the
impact that bankruptcy would have on employment. In order to avoid such
problems, it is important for administrative agencies to be put in charge of
guiding bank management following the infusion of funds, and they need to
behave like private sector stockholders who are mainly interested in maximiz-
ing corporate value. Here institutional measures are needed to guarantee that
these agencies possess a high degree of independence from politics and other
sectors of the government. The ultimate aim of nationalization is to return the
bank to the private sector. Permanent nationalization is never desirable, and if
at the beginning there is someone in the private sector that is willing to take
over, it is always preferable to bolster the capital base with private sector
rather than government funds. Therefore, the above discussion always as-
sumes that there is no other party willing to merge or acquire the bank in
question.
At the time of the Asian currency crisis, government-sponsored recapital-
ization of financial institutions was carried out on a fairly large scale in
countries like Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand. As
shown in Table 5-8, public funds in amounts ranging from 10 to 60 per cent of
GDP were infused into banks and other financial institutions. Such amounts
would have been extremely difficult for the private sector to procure spontane-
ously. That is why investment on the part of the government was the only
alternative. Probably the best conceived scheme for government involvement
following the infusion of public funds was the one adopted in Malaysia,
where the administrative agency for monitoring bank management was estab-
lished as a public corporation, independent from other government agencies.
Indonesia also set up an independent agency, Indonesian Bank Restructuring
Agency (IBRA); however, it was plagued by conflicts of interest because of
the huge variety of responsibilities that the government placed on it, including
settling nonperforming loans and the planning of a financial revitalization
strategy.
89BANK BAILOUT POLICY
B. The Administrative Framework of Bank Restructuring
As seen in the previous discussion, the framework for government involve-
ment in bank restructuring is another important aspect. The institutional frame-
work adopted by the government must be able to cope with the task at hand.
The administrative agencies involved must be both capable and clear about
what they intend to do. They must also be motivated to carry out the restruc-
turing process as swiftly as possible. However, bureaucratic mechanisms by
their nature do not function expeditiously. Business as usual at “city hall”
involves piles of unnecessary paperwork that takes a lot of time to process.
Therefore, it is necessary to motivate administrative agencies to speed up the
normal bureaucratic process in the case of bank restructuring by, for example,
setting up deadlines and requiring periodic progress reports from legislative
bodies. A lack of such motivation will likely result in the failure of initial
government involvement in a banking crisis.
It is also important to set up a proper institutional framework for deciding
what sort of tasks should be entrusted to what administrative agencies. It is not
wise, and even dangerous, to entrust total crisis management to the central
banks.6 Because its most important task is currency stabilization, in a banking
crisis there is a distinct possibility of the central bank making errors in policy
judgment. The central bank could hesitate to act quickly to assist banks in
crisis because of worries that such assistance could worsen its own financial
position and go against its obligation to stabilize the currency.7 Therefore, it is
probably wisest to allow the central bank to concentrate on its essentials
duties and set up a separate agency to deal with a banking crisis. Furthermore,
it is probably also necessary to have an institutional division of labor among
several administrative agencies, separating such tasks as overall policy-mak-
ing for financial restructuring and implementation, guidance and the infusion
of funds into banks, and the settlement of nonperforming bank loans. Such a
TABLE  5-8
ESTIMATED RECAPITALIZATION COSTS FOR COMMERCIAL BANKS, MID-OCTOBER 1998
Remaining
Estimated Amount Percentage Fiscal Costs
Costs  Disbursed of GDP as Percentage
of GDP
Indonesia 550 trillion rupiah 100 trillion rupiah 11 48
Korea, Republic of 72 trillion won 56 trillion won 13 4
Malaysia 31 billion ringgit 13 billion ringgit 4 6
Thailand 1,121 billion baht 751 billion baht 16 8
Source: World Bank (1999, Table 3.6).
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multi-facetted arrangement would help avoid the kind of conflicts of interest
mentioned above. The Asian countries adopted differing institutional arrange-
ments for dealing with their currency crises. Table 5-9, which shows the
various institutional frameworks actually adopted, shows that the Republic of
Korea and Malaysia set up a division of labor in their respective plans.
In this respect the plans adopted by Indonesia and Thailand were problem-
atic. In Indonesia the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA) set up
after the currency crisis was markedly overburdened with the total task of
bank restructuring. Such overburdened agencies are in constant danger of
conflicts of interest. In the case of Thailand, the government took a far too
passive attitude. For example, even in the settlement of nonperforming loans,
the government merely urged banks to set up private asset management com-
panies among themselves, then it ended up organizing the extremely belated
government-funded Thai Asset Management Corporation (TAMC) during
February 2001. No government agency was set up that specialized in revitaliz-
ing banks.
IV. Conclusions
In this chapter we have looked at how a financial crisis is and should be
handled after the fact. Section II presented a model analyzing the problems of
moral hazard connected with bank bailouts from the standpoint of time incon-
sistency. Then policy implications, like the pros and cons of bailouts, were
TABLE  5-9
COMPARISON OF INSTITUTIONAL DESIGNS FOR BANK CONSOLIDATION
Country Unrecoverable Loans Recapitalization Revitalization
Indonesia IBRA IBRA IBRA
Korea, Republic of Korea Asset Korea Deposit Korea Financial
Management Insurance Supervisory
Corporation Corporation Commission
Malaysia Danaharta Danamodal nonea
Thailand noneb Financial none
Institutions
Development Fund
Source: Compiled by the author.
a However, the funds infusion agency, Danamodal, was very active in supervising and
supporting the banks it funded.
b Until TAMC was finally set up in the summer of 2001.
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examined based on the model, and the results supported the argument for
bailouts under certain conditions. However, when bailouts are called for, they
need to be implemented with close attention paid to MH and conflicts of
interest within the administrative agencies involved.
Section III outlined certain points of concern regarding public fund injec-
tions and administrative frameworks when dealing with failing banks, using
the kinds of policies adopted in Asia after the currency crisis.
The time inconsistency model developed in Section II can also be used
within an international context. For example, in research on the outbreak of
the currency crisis, it has been argued that the support lent by the IMF gave
rise to MH. For this reason, some researchers have criticized IMF support as
both unproductive and harmful. In this respect, it is possible to apply to
countries a time inconsistency model applicable to bank bailouts, because
bank bailouts and the bailout of a country have many things in common. The
predicted conclusion can be stated as: the more important that the factors
behind the outbreak (and spread) of a currency crisis are not related to the
occurrence of MH, the greater the possibility that bailouts will be appropriate
(similar to the reasoning related to macro shock presented in this chapter).
Also, the appropriateness of bailouts probably differs according to the magni-
tude of the social cost of the crisis when IMF support is provided and when it
is not (similar to Cna and Cmb in the model presented here).
Appendix 5-1. The Ever-Growing Duties and Assets of IBRA
The initial duties that the Indonesian Bank Reconstructing Agency (IBRA)
was expected to assume were fourfold:8
1. Planning and implementing the revitalization of the banking sector:
Identifying banks that should be closed, determining capital infusion into
banks that should continue operations, and rebuilding and re-privatizing na-
tionalized banks.
2. Implementing and supervising of capital infusion into the banking
sector: Managing the government funds invested in banks, and dealing with
the issue of public stock offerings for the purpose of re-privatization.
3. Settling nonperforming loans: Restructuring and disposing of
nonperforming loans transferred from closed or recapitalized banks.
4. The management and sale of other government acquired assets related
to the banking crisis: IBRA seized the assets of bank owners who had received
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funding support from the central bank and later failed to repay; such seizures
were regarded as “penalties” for legal infractions (i.e., ignoring lending regu-
lations). It became an important duty of IBRA to manage or sell these assets,
such as enterprise group stock, and convert them to cash.
Given the fact that just one of the above four duties presents a monumental
task for any agency, it is clear that IBRA was overburdened, was confronted
with conflicts of interest and overwhelmed by other difficulties. Because of
the diversity of its duties, IBRA was inundated with assets from the private
sector. As shown in Appendix Table 5–1, the assets that IBRA accumulated
were worth 1.6 times the amount of the national budget. While there may have
been “economies of scale” in such a huge concentration, it was definitely a
situation ripe for political dealing and corruption, and on a number of occa-
sions IBRA has become embroiled in suspicions of foul play and political
wheeling and dealing. Such extracurricular activities are of course detrimental
to the “swift action” so necessary in dealing with a financial crisis.
APPENDIX TABLE  5-1
PRIVATE SECTOR ASSETS HELD BY IBRA
Type Worth (U.S.$100 million) Notesa
Outstanding loans of closed banks; 278 From Duties 1 and 3
unrecoverable loans of
recapitalized banks
Moveable property and real estate 9 From Duty 1
holding of closed banks
Stock of recapitalized banks 155 From Duty 2
Stock and other assets of private 154 From Duty 4
enterprises
Total 596 Equivalent to 1.6 ×
the 2001 national budget
Source: “Indoneshia: Shisan baikyaku ni chikara” [Indonesian efforts to liquidate as-
sets], Nikkei kin’yu shimbun (Tokyo), December 15, 2000.
a Added by the author.
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Notes
This and the previous chapters are based on an expanded version of Kunimune
(2001b).
1 Factory and machinery value may decline, for example, when there is precision
equipment involved that requires close monitoring and maintenance on a daily
basis.
2 Also referred to as “dynamic inconsistency.” See Kydland and Prescott (1977).
3 In this case, since bank failures will not occur, it is not necessary for the govern-
ment (even if prepared) to actually implement bank bailouts.
4 Governments that respond in such ways are best able to persuade people that
other banks are safe and thus prevent depositors from becoming panic-stricken
and causing banks runs.
5 Stimulated competition cancels bank rent obtained under a protective policy and
may eliminate the buffers that exist for responding to fluctuations in profits
caused by various degrees of risk. This is why more competition can increase the
probability of bank failures.
6 However, in order to avoid a chain reaction of runs on even healthy banks, only
the central bank can act as the lender of last resort.
7 Here we have another case of “conflict of interest.”
8 See Takeda (2000) which, however, divides the duties of IBRA into three catego-
ries.
